This is the "it doesn't matter if it actually works" factor rather than the "CDI" factor.
America is not fighting a war of national survival on a limited budget. It's fighting some wars of choice and maintaining a defence procurement industry on a seemingly unlimited budget. There is no way even the total failure of the war will personally affect the people doing the producement, and there is no need for them to economise because they can't run out of other people's money.
So, everyone involved is free to have endless meetings. Senior management can commission studies at great expense then ignore the result on a whim. They can engage in turf wars and internal empire building; after all, the real enemy is the people you're competing with for promotions.
The procurements that have been successful are mostly those resulting from urgent operational requirements, when losing to insurgents with a tiny budget became embarrassing.
(The UK is not immune to this; we've built an aircraft carrier that's supposed to use the F-35, which may not be available and we can't really afford)
I'm not sure what this comment is supposed to say. The article submitted here is pretty weak, but the operational issues about the subject were quite real and genuine problems in the "field".
That has largeley been solved with the adoption of a new series based on improved color-temperature of background tones--something overlooked when all the focus was on the patterns.
The deployment of coyete in lieu of green/olive and the current multi-cam is pretty good stuff. The problem with marpat and some of the other ACU stuff was that the color temps (ie, too much blue-ish undertones in a desert) can make you stick out more than having the wrong pattern.
This was a problem that resulted from trying to have a rural/urban combination that would work for troops fighting terrorist cells in cities and not just in classical land-warfare scenarios in open-country.
My comment was about the political and economic process that produced the choice of uniform, not the uniform itself. Of course the problems were genuine. What I am saying is that it's very likely that the problems could have been spotted and worked out before billions were spent, because the institutional culture is not good at spotting problems.
Indeed - when you consider that the purpose of the US military machine is not to defend the US, but rather to be a vehicle for vast spending and dissemination of government funds to private contractors who lobby for their bread, it's fair to say that these uniforms work perfectly.
The US military is unusually detached from reality. The ISS was under constant budgetary supervision and periodic redesigns despite costing, I think, maybe a tenth the F35 program.
I think it's a general problem of large organizations disconnected to their output, of which the US Army is one. So are most large public universities. When there is a large gap between the payer and the user of activities, and an organization has a monopoly or competitive moat, then inefficiency and rot happens.
Indeed. A control system without enough feedback. Bring back organisational cybernetics!
However, saying "gap between the payer and the user of activities" suggests that you might think a market solution would work. For the military this makes no sense and cannot work; protection is necessarily collective.
It would be nice to set the anti-tax-and-spend libertarians against the military budget, but they don't seem interested.
> It would be nice to set the anti-tax-and-spend libertarians against the military budget, but they don't seem interested.
Of all the people you pick to blame here, you pick... the libertarians? Really? Really? The guys that have Ron Paul as their spokesman? You know, the guy that has spoken out every chance he gets about military spending and the cost of wars.
>It would be nice to set the anti-tax-and-spend libertarians against the military budget, but they don't seem interested.
That 'seeming' may stem from your sources of information on those libertarians. Places like lewrockwell.com and the von Mises institute have railed against military spending for as long as I know.
(which even manages to repeat the popular conflating of quicksilver vs mercury bound as a part of a compound – maybe we should stop drinking water since it contains highly flammable hydrogen. Oh, and highly flammable oxygen.)
I'm not sure traditional free market costs work for the military, I'm just highlighting that problems happen when (sometimes by necessity) you separate payer from beneficiary. The same challenges occur in insurance markets.
That said, the military could use a lot more cost-benefit analysis in decisions like what's the best way to organize, and which weapons should be bought relative to each other. (And worry less about forcing suppliers to offer jobs in each senator's state)
People are scathing about the USMC's desire to look distinctive, and about senior officers' desire for soldiers to look good.
Obviously fashion shouldn't trump everything, but looking and feeling the part is a considerable part of the moral component of fighting power. I think denying that is denying some basic human psychology. Why do armies spend money on flags, dress uniforms, buglers, horses, mascot dogs, medals, bands and so on? It's because the ethos they create is a seriously important part of building a group of men who can operate together in extreme situations.
The USMC and other branches are worried about how their uniforms look and how distinctive they are because it's one essential part of preparing to fight a war.
My experience was that my soldiers took a huge amount of pride in looking like a British Army soldier from their particular capbadge - especially in an operational environment. Part of my unit's cohesion and pride when operating in joint environments was being smart in their own particular unique way.
That pride and attention to detail then carries over into their fieldcraft and tactics.
Young men don't fight for the Ministry of Defence, they fight for their regiment and their mates - a group created by looking and acting just a little bit differently to other people.
The Navy's camo looks bizarre (it doesn't blend with trees, ships, or office equipment), but turns out it's main purpose is to hide the stains that a sailor picks up during their duty day, from oil & grease to paint drips. So as a duty uniform, it succeeds.
The Air Force camo was introduced as a pure ego move. It doesn't blend, oil & hydraulic stains can't be wiped off the boots, and it's too hot. And unlike the green polyester duty uniforms of the 70's & 80's you can't shorten or roll-up the sleeves.
My understand why they don't all buy the multi-cam is that the design is copyrighted and the DoD and the owner couldn't come to an agreement on the licensing fees.
> Continuing its efforts to reduce costs to the Army and in an attempt to eliminate the Army’s concerns that MultiCam® was more expensive than UCP, Crye submitted several formal proposals which proved that the Army could procure MultiCam® gear at prices within 1% of UCP gear. Crye’s proposals additionally showed that this could be accomplished with no upfront cost to the Army.
> The Army rejected all of Crye’s proposals and did not present any counter proposals, effectively saying that a proven increase in Soldier survivability was not worth a price difference of less than 1%.
Nope, they are dead wrong. I was in the Army during both Bush maladministrations, and the Marines doing their own thing was one of the proximate causes of the horrible Army ACU (as well as the weird Air Force and Navy blueish camo thingeys). From what I remember the Marines (RAWR, because they are MARINES, TOUGH!) didn't want their camo licensed out to the other branches, so the everyone went their own way. How is this cost effective? It certainly makes getting uniform apparel that much harder on joint bases (where they have to stock everything, like the Presidio of Monterey), or isolated people in Guard/Reserve units, whose nearest active duty installation may not be in their branch.
I believe the Marines are also responsible for ruining the F-35 to the tune of $1 trillion over the lifetime of the plane.
> The Pentagon intends to spend roughly $399 billion to develop and buy 2,443 of the planes. However, over the course of the aircrafts' lifetimes, operating costs are expected to exceed $1 trillion. Lockheed has carefully hired suppliers and subcontractors in almost every state to ensure that virtually all senators and members of Congress have a stake in keeping the program -- and the jobs it has created -- in place.
The Marines wanted VTOL and that made the plane worse in every other way.
The Marines have a mindset that they are SPECIAL. I mean that in a serious way, despite the Marines rarely doing anything that's not also done by the Army. It'd make more sense for Marine air units to fly off of Navy carriers, rather than waste money on a VTOL version of the F-35.
A Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is not supported by Navy aircraft carriers (see Marine Expeditionary Unit). A MAGTF is supported by Navy Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) class ships that require VTOL capable aircraft. The AV8-B Harrier is the current aircraft that fits this role, which the F-35 is meant to replace.
+1 correct. A carrier battle group can't be everywhere, and the immense operational options available to a VTOL contingent make the program viable. I'm a former Navy pilot, and agree that VTOL gets the job done in many tight situations.
Yeah, if all 10 super carriers are tied up, I'm sure we'll have plenty of resources to keep those hundred million dollar planes ready to rock.
I realize sarcasm is a poor excuse for humor, but if all ten are unavailable (because of shooting and getting shot at), i think we (the US) would have a pretty rough time getting those planes working.
If their not available because of non-war reasons, it seems like the mission isn't really that big of a deal anyway.
I sort of think the US goes for the Cadillac solution for everything. Perhaps that's my bias because i only hear about the expensive stuff. I'd sort of expect there to be a nice gradient between really super high tech, down to cheap simple and reliable. But whatever, armchair quarterback.
The Marines fly F-18s from Navy carriers, and presumably they will continue this with the F-35. The problem is that the whole program, which is the biggest military procurement program ever, to provide the principal combat aircraft for the entire U.S. military, has been totally compromised by this niche requirement of a VTOL version.
If the problem is not enough Marine firepower from the full deck carriers, the Marines should just buy more CTOL aircraft and put them on the carriers. All of the carrier air wings have been downsized since the cold war, and carriers are only going to sea with 65 or so aircraft, when they can hold 90. I'd much rather have 8 fully capable CTOL fighters on the full-deck carrier that is definitely going to be around in any amphibious landing than 8 low-performance (range and payload) VTOL fighters from an LHA/LHD.
Instead, we get a seriously compromised F-35A and C as far as I can tell because of what happened at Guadalcanal 70 years ago.
Well said. Also, its not as if the Marines have been doing a lot of amphibious landings lately. And honestly shouldn't be doing any without carrier or land based cover.
Its interesting though, the LHA/LHDs are bigger than most other countries aircraft carriers...
Yes but in what major engagement that we could reasonably expect to face in the next several decades would a USMC task force be sent without a carrier group. If there is a serious need for airpower in a region there's no way we're not going to send in a supercarrier.
It is highly unlikely that a MAGTF would be in-theater without a CVBG in the area. However, the CVBG may not be tasked with supporting the MAGTF, or other tasking may take priority. The MAGTF's squadrons are tasked with direct support of the TF's ground forces before, during, and after the landing. Relying on the CVBG for this either forces the CAG to split its resources and attention (reducing is efficiency) or leaves the Marines with no air cover.
I know that is the rationale for USMC CAS but I just wonder if the cost of acquiring and flying a STOVL aircraft just for that very specific requirement is justified.
In the case of the JSF program, maybe if that requirement had gotten split off from the rest of the program it could've been done for a cheaper price that would make it worthwhile. But the costs of the F-35 are still not done soaring out of control and at the end of it all I can't imagine that it will be worth the cost for the Marine Corps to have air cover during amphibious landings.
MEUs never have a carrier attached, as carriers only sail in CVBGs. However, there has been at least one CVBG in-theater constantly since OIF began, and I doubt the Navy would ever send an MEU into a theater that did not have a CVBG present.
Correct. The Marines desired a plane capable of VTOL and when DOD forced the idea of a singular fighter, they said "okay but we need VTOL" (and the other branches had their own operational needs), and thus we have this great-at-nothing-horrible-at-everything F-35.
Isn't the VTOL version basically a different plane with major differences under the skin? I'm not sure how it directly affected the designs of the non VTOL versions of the airplane...
I was confused reading your comment, because I assumed the "they" in your first sentence meant those that wrote the editorial. But based on the rest of your comment, the "they" must be the military bureaucracy, because your comment agrees with the editorial.
You are correct, I read the article early in the morning before coffee, and thought the Economist was taking the side of the Marines, et al. There's a lot of Marine veneration in the media, surprisingly.
Reminds me of the long running fiasco over the new boots in the British army which lead to trench foot in the Falklands war.
As the Army Rumour service (Arsepedia) says
"All in all, the saga of British Army boot procurement is pretty pathetic: that we can consistently buy such rubbish, thus inevitably incurring far higher costs than would be necessary in buying one of the many excellent commercial products, is astonishing but symptomatic of British Defence Policy. At a rough estimate, 50% of British soldiers wear boots they have bought for themselves when on operations or exercise. "
I don't see a big problem with each branch doing their own unis. They certainly are large enough. And the design costs are negligible in the scheme of things. Sure, they could share some best practices. Clearly they have different needs.
I think MultiCam variations (incl. Camogrom) are the best "universal" pattern that will suit most envirnoments, it works well in various lighting contitions too.
Some people have Economist subs. Some people haven't read any Economist articles this mobth and thus won't hit the paywall. Some people will evade the paywall.
As a military member who has worn three separate uniform implementations over the past 10+ years I can tell you that no-one who is serving thinks the changes are anything but silly.
Everyone I knew thought that the introduction of multicam in AFG was a great jumping off point for all the services to share a uniform - but of course that will never happen with all the GO level pissing matches that happen.
This rivalry between branches is probably the leading cause to the excessive military budgets the US has. Between the boondoggle that is the F35; the rivalry amongst the branches they would not compromise on a design so it had to do it all; to the ludicrous idea that super carriers have survivability in a world of submarines and drones.
By being separate it introduces coordination problems, results in duplicated systems, and an all around pissing contest.
Give them all one uniform, one set of regulations, and one source of funding. Then retire off all the desk jockey O-6 and and above who simply serve no purpose but to manage an acronym
In an infamous 2002 wargame, an American carrier and much of its fleet were destroyed by swarms of speedboats with missiles, simulating potential Iranian tactics.
Also, anti-ship ballistic missiles keep getting better. It's not clear whether the US Navy could stop the latest generation of Chinese anti-ship missiles.
In both cases, a supercarrier suffers a serious probabilistic problem: the attackers only have to get through once. The defenders need to be 100% effective. That's not realistic in a world where it's economically feasible to field thousands of cheap drones.
Cheap drones have small payloads, and one small payload won't do disastrous damage to a carrier. The attackers have to get through once with a serious weapon, or many times with small, cheap weapons.
Is there a small, cheap weapon that is nasty enough, without relying on crazy luck? Do carriers have known vulnerabilities to small weapons, as in Star Wars Ep. IV?
Edit: Just read up on USS Cole, and a small boat made a 40ft hole in the side, killed 17 and injured 39 sailors. Very serious. Is this enough to disable a carrier? Also, small boats have enormously more payload than a drone. Wikipedia says an attack on USS Sullivan failed when the overloaded attack boat sank, so clearly they are using all that capacity.
Advances in computerized image processing and on-demand fabric printing have not only made camouflage patterns obsolete, but also the entire concept of choosing a camouflage pattern for all military uniforms worldwide.
What quartermasters need is a machine that will take photographs of the local terrain as input, calculate a camouflage pattern from them, and print that pattern on unmarked uniforms. The result would be matched only by a ghillie suit, which takes actual landscape features and physically attaches them to the fabric.
Such a machine would be rejected any day of the week by a council of colonels during peacetime. During actual wartime, captains will somehow fail to notice uniform violations where the approved patterns have been defaced by the very same equipment that civilian hunters had already been using for years on the canvas for their tree stands and duck blinds.
Beware the military-industrial complex indeed. I'd say the sector was ripe for disruption, but disruptors will be shot on sight.
If you want to get the military to buy something that actually works, you have to market it to civilian outdoorsmen and make it commercial off-the-shelf technology. Some soldiers will use it while off duty or after their service contracts expire, and if you get very lucky with the good ol' boy network, someone will quietly process regular small procurements to ensure that you will not go out of business before you get the chance to save America from a land invasion by the Commie Fascist Nation of Scary Bogeymen.
There has always been a huge gulf between wartime military development and peacetime research. Peacetime always produces stuff that looks cool while doing absolutely everything that needed to be done for the last war, plus a boatload of things that might have been useful if that war had dragged on long enough. Wartime development produces stuff that is cheap, ugly, and works well for the current war.
That's how a soldier's kit can end up with silly string from a toy store or laser levels from a hardware store. By the time the army starts issuing that stuff to its units, the enemy had already stopped using tripwires to trigger booby traps. They switched to non-metallic pressure plates that use the physical movement of reactants to detonate an explosive. And so maybe someone breeds special houseflies to be attracted to the detonator chemicals, and then some poor grunt is stuck feeding the bomb-detector maggots in camp.
And you just have to hope the war doesn't end right there, because then that guy will be a professional maggot wrangler for the next 20 years, training flies to do everything from finding terrorists in truck stops to landing only on the poop from generals and admirals.
The inefficiency is built into the system. You absolutely cannot fix it from where you are sitting. You can consider it a form of welfare for veterans, like VA health care, except with fewer suicides. It would be extremely embarrassing for the military to have to admit that they make some people less qualified to hold jobs in the public sector. Whether that is due to the brain damage caused by explosive shockwaves passing through the skull or the brain damage caused by filling out reams of pointless bureaucratic paperwork is immaterial. As long as stories about neglected veterans hit the news, discharged folks will need to be put into safe jobs. And that is how military contracts go billions over budget. That is why none of this crap ever works until after the war actually starts.
Given that a large percentage of the mainstream media is moving towards X articles/month free, register to get Y articles/month free, pay to get full access, you're basically asking that no main stream media links get posted here.
That pretty much guarantees that the only posts we'll see are from the tech bubble, and one I'd like to avoid.
As long as the workaround is as simple as it is here (right click, open in incognito), I don't think we should avoid posting articles from the Economist or other mainstream media sites here.
There are plenty of free outlets for political and economic news. Some examples include CEPR, DemocracyNow, Tom Dispatch, http://ceinquiry.wordpress.com/, etc
Absolutely. The Marines designed an "innovative" uniform that worked better than the status quo and increased esprit de corps because it was distinctive. The problem is the ridiculous "me too" copycat designs that proliferated since then. Everyone I know hates the Army's "floral couch", the Navy's "hope I don't fall overboard", and the Air Force's tiger stripes.
no. because with "really small" governments you still get "really big" companies. The term "deregulation" really epitomizes this - the idea that there should be fewer laws restricting companies from harming others and that the magical free hand of the market will miraculously prevent malfeasance and malevolent profiteering in some ayn rand utopia. what a lovely fantasy.
The process I've seen called "decivilizing" - the willful dismantling of the post-industrial societal state back to some goal that is effectively an 18th century corporate oligarchy.
The problem is that then you get companies which effect as governments - it's no mistake that the US flag is a spinoff of the maritime flag of the East India Trading corporation - it was effectively a de facto governing body - above the state.
The corporate becomes the state when the state is weak. They are poised to fill such a power vacuum and it happens immediately.
I'm not sure exactly the point you're making but sorta of agree that the design costs are marginal. Each branch is certainly large enough to be doing their own unis to meet their own needs, one of them being distinction.
America is not fighting a war of national survival on a limited budget. It's fighting some wars of choice and maintaining a defence procurement industry on a seemingly unlimited budget. There is no way even the total failure of the war will personally affect the people doing the producement, and there is no need for them to economise because they can't run out of other people's money.
So, everyone involved is free to have endless meetings. Senior management can commission studies at great expense then ignore the result on a whim. They can engage in turf wars and internal empire building; after all, the real enemy is the people you're competing with for promotions.
The procurements that have been successful are mostly those resulting from urgent operational requirements, when losing to insurgents with a tiny budget became embarrassing.
(The UK is not immune to this; we've built an aircraft carrier that's supposed to use the F-35, which may not be available and we can't really afford)